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It seems sensible that international migration has no impact on the size of world 
population. However, this paper argues that international migration may have resulted in a 
smaller world population than in the non migration scenario. The author claims that most of 
recent migration has been from high to low birth-rate countries, and since migrants typically 
adopt and send back ideas that prevail in host countries, they are potential agents of the 
diffusion of demographic modernity to their country of origin.  
The author uses data from three major origin countries: Morocco and Turkey (where 
emigration is bound for the West), and Egypt (where emigration is bound for the Gulf). These 
three countries offer contrasted situations: the host countries are either more (the West) or 
less (the Gulf) advanced in their demographic transition than the home country. He finds 
empirical evidence that time-series data on birth rates and migrant remittances (reflecting the 
intensity of the relationship between the emigrants and their home country) are strongly 
correlated. Correlation is negative for Morocco and Turkey, and positive for Egypt. This 
suggests that Moroccan and Turkish emigration has been accompanied by a fundamental 
change of attitudes regarding marriage and birth, while the opposite holds for Egyptian 
migration. 
The broader conclusions from this paper are that migration may have caused a 
relaxation of demographic pressures for the world as a whole. In addition, if it turns out that 




Migration is commonly regarded by development economists as a potentially win-win 
process, one susceptible to creating net wealth in both regions of origin and destination of 
migrants. How can the question of whether international migration is a “positive sum game” 
be transposed to demography? This paper advances the argument that international migration 
has contributed to contain the demographic explosion, more precisely that population 
movements from developing to more developed countries during the last decades have 
resulted in a smaller global world population than the one which would have been attained 
had no international migration taken place. In other words, it argues that international 
migration has contributed to reducing the risk of world overpopulation,
1 i.e., it has increased 
global security through demographic change.  
The mechanism through which international migration is hypothesized to play on 
global demography is simple: most migration during the period of demographic transition
2—
a period during which international differentials in birth rates are peaking—has been from 
high to low birth-rate countries. It is assumed that, because international migrants adopt for 
themselves, and send back to their home countries, models and ideas that prevail in host 
countries, they are susceptible to be agents of the diffusion of demographic modernity.  
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) offers a particularly interesting case in 
point for testing the hypothesis that migrants are potential vectors of demographic change. 
                                           
1 Looking at the long term, the common sense would on the contrary associate migration with the search for 
vital space, that is with the demographic expansion of mankind rather than the reduction of its rate of growth. 
As Kingsley Davis (1988) puts it “Liberal political and economic leaders tend to believe that a movement from 
areas of high population density to areas of low population density is […] desirable [while] their opponents 
point out that the Earth is already too crowded, that migration by helping to fill the last remaining open spaces, 
is making the crowding worse » (p. 252-3). In a long historical perspective, it is true that migration has often 
resulted in peopling scarcely peopled areas. However, things have changed: there are no longer ‘empty’ places 
and the world is now divided into well delineated political entities, between which strong economic differentials 
are the main driver of migration, disregarding population density.  4
Several MENA countries witness an intense emigration, with emigrants bound either for the 
Gulf or for the West, according to countries of departure and time. With regard to 
demographic differentials encountered through migration, MENA thus offers contrasted 
situations: host countries of emigrants are sometimes less, sometimes more advanced in their 
demographic transition than their home countries. If the central hypothesis of the paper is 
true, then emigration from MENA countries will have modified the course of the 
demographic transition of origin countries of migrants in two opposite directions, according 
to places of destination: slowing it down where emigrants are destined to the Gulf and 
speeding it up where they emigrate to the West.  
The paper is divided into five sections. Section 1 examines the place of migration in 
demographic analysis. Section 2 proposes a general framework of interaction between 
migration and demographic change. Section 3 is a rapid overview of the well-documented 
side of this framework, i.e. the impact of migration on the demography of migrants. Section 4 
is a very first attempt to explore the other side of the framework, i.e. the impact of migration 
on the demography of non-migrants in countries experiencing significant rates of emigration, 
with MENA as an example. Section 5 offers a partial validation of the main hypothesis by 
comparing Morocco, Turkey and Egypt. 
 
1.  The demographic ideal of a closed population  
Migration was never built up by demographers at the same level of formal elaboration 
as the two other components of population change, i.e. birth rates and death rates which form 
together the ‘natural’ growth of any population. Migration is absent from the core model of 
                                                                                                                                   
2 The “demographic transition” is the shift from high to low levels of death and birth rates, with a time gap 
between the decrease of death rates and that of birth rates, and consequently a period of rapid population growth 
when death rates are already low while birth rates are still high.  5
formal demography — known as the ‘theory of stable populations’ — and methods for 
estimating migration are much less settled than those devised for measuring fertility and 
mortality.   
Formal demography is anchored in the tradition of biology. It models population 
reproduction as the result of two biological processes, natality and mortality. The modern 
mathematical demography founded by Alfred Lotka simply excludes external migration
3: 
“By a very natural abstraction, demographic analysis envisages as a point of departure the 
case of a closed population, that is to say, a population whose numbers receive new 
accessions only through births and suffers losses only through deaths, immigration and 
emigration being excluded” (Lotka 1998 [1939], p. 53). Basic analytical models—to begin 
with the most commonly used of them, i.e. the life table which describes the extinction of a 
generation “in the absence of external migration”—are constructed on the assumption of a 
“closed” population, i.e. a population that receives or sends no external migration
4. 
True populations however are not closed. States, or nations, define populations and 
borders separate national populations from one another. As soon as a population is delineated 
by a border, border crossing becomes one of the factors of its growth and reproduction. For 
Lotka this is not a reason for introducing migration in the fundamental demographic 
equations: “Demographic statistics is concerned primarily with human populations, and 
particularly with certain more or less isolated populations, as for example those of a nation 
[…] The practical problems [posed by migration across borders] are reduced more and more 
as the area included in the study expands, since emigration and immigration are plainly 
functions of the border periphery, whereas births and deaths are instead functions of the land 
                                           
3 In this section we use the term ‘external’ rather than ‘international’ migration. The latter refers to nations, a 
modern division of the world which bears no meaning for most of history, while the former refers inclusively to 
any sort of territory.  6
area, and the ratio between the periphery and the internal area continuously decreases as the 
latter increases. Circumstances of politics and commerce further tend to accentuate that 
effect, so that for an entire country migration can in certain cases be almost negligible as a 
factor determining the growth of its population […]” (Ibid.)
 5. 
States are not only frames of reference for the delimitation of any national population; 
they also form the actual frame of population data collection. Statistical records thus 
incorporate migration, implicitly in vital statistics
6 or explicitly in migration statistics. As a 
result, migration is a matter of interest for demographers, which they take into account as 
soon as they leave models for tackling real statistics. Their interest in migration can follow 
two very distinct purposes: either eliminating migration from vital records for its interference 
with biological demography, or measuring migration for its contribution to overall 
demography. 
Eliminating the interference of external migration with the statistical observation of 
births and deaths has been an important concern for demographers. Following chemistry
7, 
formal demography aims at studying fertility and mortality “in the pure state,” and for this 
                                                                                                                                   
4 Later on, Keyfitz (1968) introduced the notion of   “interacting populations”, and the tool of “immigration 
vector” in the mathematics of population. 
5 Interestingly, theories of international migration do not put a greater emphasis on demography than the one 
demographic theory puts on international migration. Economic theories recognise that international differentials 
are key factors of migration, but they rarely consider demographic differentials (in population density or 
population growth) as true factors. Only few of them would endorse a statement such as “modern migration 
stems mainly from the difference in population growth between the developed and the less developed countries 
» (Davis 1988 p. 256). In fact, there are too many exceptions to make a rule of it. To take a Middle Eastern 
example, Lebanon is a country of emigration to Saudi Arabia, despite the fact that Lebanon has a much lower 
rate of natural population growth than Saudi Arabia (below 1% compared with 3.3% in 1995-2000), and 
Lebanon is a place of immigration for Syrians, despite the fact that Lebanon has a much higher demographic 
density than Syria. 
6 For example, international migration affects death records and consequently the statistical observation of 
mortality: the death of an emigrant escapes national statistics of countries of origin so that emigration produces 
the same result as death in reducing the size of a generation. 
7 Henry (1972) “Analyser, c’est décomposer un tout en ses parties : […] L’observation nous fournit des données 
à l’état brut […] Ces données brutes, qui peuvent paraître simples à un esprit superficiel, sont en réalité le fruit 
de combinaisons ou de mélanges fort compliqués où interviennent quantités d’éléments […] Comme en chimie, 
c’est à l’analyse qu’il revient d’isoler le phénomène à l’état pur […] Dans nos observations se mêlent l’effet du 
phénomène qui nous intéresse, la nuptialité, et des phénomènes perturbateurs, mortalité et migrations. » (p. 20-
21).  7
purpose needs to remove the blurring effect of external migration (Henry 1972). What would 
have been recorded numbers of births and deaths if no migration had taken place? This is the 
question to be solved. Because migration is a selective process and because it changes the 
course of life, its statistical interference with fertility and mortality is a complex one. Do 
those who have emigrated have the same probability of giving birth or of dying than those 
who have not emigrated? To which extent do birth rates and death rates obtained on 
incomplete statistics (they do not cover emigrants) apply to all members of the generation 
under consideration? How to deal with the dependence in probability of emigration on one 
side, and fertility or mortality on the other side? These questions have produced more 
interesting methodological developments in demography than additional knowledge on 
migration itself
8. 
Measuring migration also fully enters within the scope of demography, insofar as the 
overall growth of any population is the addition of its external migration to its natural 
growth
9. Because migrants have a specific age profile, their contribution to the age structure 
of the population has also become a topic of interest in demography, recently rekindled by 
the worry about consequences of ageing in industrialized countries. The question of how to 
balance decreasing fertility rates by sustained flows of immigrants has received a certain 
attention from demographers (Keyfitz 1981, United Nations 2000)
10. However, for logical 
reasons intrinsic to migration itself the modeling of external migration never went very far in 
                                           
8 An overview of the (modest) place of migration in demography is given by Keely (2000). 
9 The balancing equation of population growth writes: P2 – P1 = B – D + I – E  where P1 and P2 name the total 
population at dates 1 and 2, and B, D, I, E are respectively the numbers of births, deaths, immigrants and 
emigrants recorded between dates 1 and 2. 
10 A much debated report of the United Nations (2000) dedicated to exploring how migration could bring an 
answer to ageing made use of population projections to answer the question “what level of migration from less 
developed countries would be required to compensate for negative demographic trends in more developed 
countries ? »  8
demographic analysis
11, and for limits belonging to the social rather than biological nature of 
external migration, no robust framework of determinants comparable to those applied to 
mortality and fertility was never devised in the demographic study of migration. As Davis 
(1988) puts it “international migration […] resembles mortality and fertility in being part of 
the fundamental balancing equation in demography, which says that any population change is 
a function of natural increase and net migration  […] but unlike mortality and fertility, it has 
no biological constraints and hence no built-in limits. There is no ‘normal’ or ‘natural’ rate of 
migration” (p. 245). 
 
2.   Modeling the impact of international migration on birth rates 
To sum up, demography basically deals with international migration as numbers to be 
added (immigration) or subtracted (emigration) to any population defined by national 
boundaries. No individual country has a zero balance of external migration, but the entire 
world has, because it obviously receives no external migration. Despite this indisputable fact 
we argue, however, that flows of international migration might change the total number of 
inhabitants on earth, as a result of the impact international migration can have on natural 
population growth, notably on birth rates
12. We focus here on two particular sub-populations: 
migrants themselves, and the community they have left behind in home countries.  
                                           
11 Henry (1972)  “Dans l’état actuel de la démographie, on ne sait pas étudier les phénomènes ouverts en tant 
que tels […] » “L’émigration d’une région A […]  concerne le membres de la population étudiée et fait sortir de 
cette population : […] L’immigration dans une région B résulte, elle, de l’arrivée de personnes étrangères à 
cette région […] les événements qui figurent au numérateur ne concernent pas les membres de la population 
figurant au dénominateur. […] Il n’y a pas symétrie entre l’émigration de A vers B et l’immigration en B 
provenant de A : […] Dans ces conditions, l’étude des mouvements migratoires est, au moins sous son aspect 
théorique, une étude de sortie, d’émigration » (p. 198-9). 
12 Mortality is also linked with migration. For example, an interesting “Mediterranean” pattern of health has 
been found among migrant populations (Khlat & Darmon 2003). Including mortality in the paper would have 
complicated our purpose for only little added value, since mortality does not play as important a role as fertility 
in contemporary international demographic differentials.  9
For those who move, migration is susceptible to produce two distinct impacts on 
patterns of family building. The first is a short-term one which results from imbalances in the 
sex ratio of migration flows—labor migration (whether of men or of women) delays marriage 
and procreation, while migration of family reunification yields the opposite effect, and allows 
to recover birth rates deficits of previous steps in individuals’ life cycle—, and the second is 
a long-term one resulting from the gradual adjustment of migrants to their host population, 
which translates into a convergence of migrants’ demographic patterns with those prevailing 
in receiving countries. This last effect is shown on Figure 1, left arrow. It is a limited one, 
since it affects only migrants themselves.  
Those who don’t move but live in communities from where numerous migrants have 
departed might also see their demography affected by migration. This will happen as soon as 
their living conditions are transformed by the emigration of relatives or neighbors on one 
side, and their vision of life is changed by alternative models to which they are exposed 
through the emigration of members of their community on the other side. Because expatriates 
are increasingly forming transnational communities in close contact with the environment left 
behind through fast travel and  cheap telecommunications, modern migrants is still part of the 
game in their home countries, in particular in the diffusion of models. Their possible impact 
on patterns of family building and procreation is shown in Figure 1, right arrow. It is an 
enlarged effect, not limited to migrants themselves and their close families, but extended to 
their entire local community at home, and possibly to the larger society through the media. 
This process interacts with the first one: the more adjusted the emigrants to their host 
society—and the better connected to the world left behind—the more efficient their diffusion 
of new models and ideas in their home society.  
This argument refers to the ideational frame of the demographic transition, by far less 
researched and less modeled than its structural frame. Much more has been written on the  10
decline of fertility in relation with structural transformations such as the spread of mass 
education, urbanization, or the shift from agriculture to services, than on the role played by 
culture and values in demographic change. As a consequence, empirical evidence is scanty: 
most, if not all, large fertility surveys designed on a highly standardized and comparative 
scheme
13 have disregarded ideas and values, with the exception of a handful of questions 
directly related with family building, such as the ideal number children, sex preference, or 
views about marriage. For lack of individual data on more fundamental ideas and values 
expressing the way people see their lives, this paper will content itself with a macro 
approach, and will not reach the micro level which would allow a true validation of the 
hypothesis that migration is a vehicle for alternative ideas
14.  
Figure 1: A framework of the impact of international migration on birth rates 
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13 The core questionnaire of the World Fertility Survey (WFS) devised in the 1970s has been reproduced—with 
some amendments—in all major subsequent surveys, notably the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) of the 
1980s-1990s and the Papchild (1990s) and Papfam (2000s) initiated by the Arab League.  
14 At the other side of the spectrum, for lack of accurate time series on migration in many countries, the paper 
will not offer any estimation of the global demographic impact of international migration, that is the reduction 
of the world population rate of growth which can be attributed to migration.  11
3. Downstream demographic adjustment of migrants 
When people move, they change their environment but not their selves. In a short 
lapse of time, they will be subjected to the living conditions prevailing in their new 
environment, which are important to determine the cost of children. For material reasons, 
migration will most probably affect the timing of childbearing and the desired number of 
children. It will take longer however for immigrants to change some of their individual 
characteristics, such as the level of education which is recognized an important determinant 
of fertility, and even longer to adapt to a new culture. This will happen either later in the 
course of their own lives or only to their children. A quick but limited effect of migration on 
fertility has thus to be expected, before any deeper shift takes place.  
In fact, the convergence of immigrants’ fertility with natives’ seems to be a slow 
process: for example in France—the country which hosts the largest Arab expatriate 
community outside the Arab world—total fertility rates among immigrants women of MENA 
origin have decreased during the 1980s and the 1990s, thus reducing the distance with their 
host population, but surprisingly at a much slower pace than in their countries of origin 
(Table 1). Algerian women living in France have experienced an earlier fertility decline than 
those left behind in Algeria (6.77 children per women against 4.22 in 1980), but since this 
decline has been slower among the former than the latter, Algerian emigrants have now 
higher fertility rates than their non-migrant fellow citizens in Algeria (3.19 against 2.97 in 
2000). The same holds for Moroccan, Tunisian and Turkish women. This unexpected result is 
largely due to a statistical artifact resulting from two characteristics of migration: for women 
migration is often caused by marriage (another result of which being fertility), and it is a 
selective phenomenon. 
To fully understand this artifact it has to be borne in mind that, after the quasi-closure 
of Europe to labor immigration starting from the mid 1970s, family reunification has become  12
the first channel of legal entry for non-European aliens. Firstly, family reunification applies 
to wives or husbands, which means that a birth is very likely to follow shortly after 
migration
15. On average, 49% of Algerian immigrant women are married at the time of 
immigration in France, 52% of Moroccans and Tunisians and 59% of Turks (Borrel & Tavan 
2003). That births delayed in countries of origin are recovered in countries of emigration 
clearly emerges from the fact that, for a same generation of women, those who reside in 
France for more than 10 years have a much lower level of fertility than those arrived from 
less than ten years (Table 2)
16. The demographic adjustment effectively operates, but only 
after certain duration of stay. Secondly, family reunification tends to perpetuate the social 
selection of migrants, and those arrived in France at the time of massive labor migration 
(before 1974) where mostly unskilled workers, belonging to social groups with higher 
fertility than the national average in their home countries. 
Before concluding this section, two remarks should be made. First, the social 
selection of migrants varies with home and host countries. For example, despite Egypt is a 
country with higher birth rates than Lebanon, Egyptian immigrants in Australia have much 
lower birth rates than Lebanese immigrants in the same country. In 1981, total fertility rates 
were 5.40 children per woman in Egypt and 4.05 in Lebanon, while their immigrant 
communities in Australia had total fertility rates of  2.51 and 4.80 respectively (Young 1991). 
Egyptians in Australia were more advanced than Lebanese in their demographic transition, 
while the contrary was true for their countries of origin, a probable sign of upward social 
selection of migrants to Australia in Egypt and downward in Lebanon. As a result of 
                                           
15 A high proportion of children are first children (as soon as fertility is low) and most first children are born 
during the first years of marriage. 
16 Carlson (1985) analyses in another context (the U.S.) how the event of migration and a new social context 
combine to affect the vital rates of migrant populations. The timing of marriage remains affected by a cultural 
factor “which may be more than a simple combination of levels of schooling and job experience” (p. 64). The 
timing of births displays a strong, temporary and short-term impact of immigration, but no evidence of any 
longer-term effect: migrants are highly adaptable.  13
convergence with native Australians, fertility declined from one generation of immigrants to 
the next among Lebanese, but not among Egyptians who had since their arrival a lower 
fertility than average Australians
17.  
The second remark on adjustment of migrants to their host societies is that 
convergence might happen faster in demography than in other family related issues. A survey 
among immigrants from Turkey and Morocco carried out in Belgium in the early 1990s 
found that in matters directly related with fertility, such as the desired family size, the 
preference for boys or girls, the utility of children and contraception, migration produces a 
decisive change. For example, the percentage of married women aged 25-29 using 
contraceptive was respectively 79% and 71% among Turkish and Moroccan women living in 
Belgium, compared with 44% and 35% in their countries of origin the same year. When it 
comes to marriage the choice of partner and female autonomy, however, only a “prudent shift 
in the code of conducts” is observed: marriage decided on free individual choice without 
parents interfering remains very rare and most often a source of conflict. Social and cultural 
changes would thus proceed at different paces according to domains (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 
1995).  
 
4.  Patriarchal vs. individualistic values sent back home by migrants 
From the mid-1970s until the late 1980s, Arab countries were displaying a puzzling 
pattern of fertility differentials: contrary to what is observed at the level of the world—a 
negative correlation between GDP per capita and birth rates—the richest Arab countries were 
also those with the highest birth rates. As it will be briefly recalled in the next paragraph, this 
                                           
17 TFR had declined from 5.09 children per women among Lebanese immigrant women in Australia born in 
1917-21 to 4.35 for those born in 1937-41 (youngest generation having completed its fertility in 1981), while 
among Egyptians the decline was only from 2.57 to 2.42 (Young 1991).  14
has been interpreted as the result of oil wealth and the particular type of state-to-society 
relationship it generated (Fargues, 1993). Even more puzzling, when only non-oil Arab 
countries were compared with each other, some of those best endowed with what is 
considered universal factors of the fertility transition—such as good health or high level of 
female education—were keeping higher levels of fertility than countries less endowed with 
these same factors. In other words, a single country could be characterized at the same time 
by advance in well-being and delay in demographic matters
18. This apparent anomaly was 
due in part to migration, which served as a vehicle for values and models. 
All began in the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Beforehand, all Arab countries 
except one, Lebanon, were still in a pre-transitional stage regarding fertility, with total 
fertility rates ranging from 6 to more than 8 children per woman according to country, and it 
was only in the second half of the 1970s that social and economic transformations began to 
translate into rising age at marriage among women (Rashad & Osman 2003) and birth 
control. However, in major Arab oil producing countries (the Gulf states, Libya and Algeria), 
the sudden change in scale of state revenues in the immediate aftermath of the 1973 war 
which sent crude oil prices soaring, jammed the transition of fertility. Oil revenues enabled 
governments to establish welfare state systems through financing development (health, 
education, etc.) on one hand, and subsidizing consumption on the other hand.  
While development activities were conducive to fertility decline, subsidized 
consumption, by reducing the cost of children, could work to the opposite effect. This is what 
happened in a number of Arab countries, especially the most oil-rich ones, whose 
governments, by keeping the population in check through generous oil wealth redistribution, 
were able to play the forces of social conservatism and change off against one another. Social 
                                           
18 For example Jordan was better endowed than Morocco with regard to health or educational status of the 
population, but Morocco was far in advance on Jordan with regard to birth control.  15
conservatism was reflected in particular by a continuing very low labor force participation 
rate among married women
19. So, by both cutting the costs of fertility and keeping women in 
the home, oil revenues indirectly promoted high fertility. To some extent, oil revenues 
“generated” population
20. As if by contagion, the oil-type of early marriage and high birth 
rates persisted in non-oil countries of the Mashreq (except Lebanon), while in the distant 
Maghreb it gradually gave room to delayed marriage and birth control. The transition of 
fertility happened earlier in Tunisia and Morocco than in Jordan, Syria, Yemen and even 
Egypt. Migration offers a key for understanding what happened then. Figure 2 clearly shows 
that in the second half of the 1980s, when fertility differentials between MENA countries 
were peaking, all the countries of emigration to the Gulf had an above-average level of 
fertility (upper-left panel of Figure 2), while all the countries of emigration to the West had 
below average levels of fertility (lower-left panel).  
                                           
19 A mechanism sustained in the Gulf by labour imports, since women-dominated jobs—notably in education, 
health and administration—could be occupied by immigrant women. 
20 The oil crisis started in the mid-1980s gradually put an end to this mechanism.   16
Figure 2 : Migration and Fertility in MENAcountries
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As soon as a surprising pattern of Mashreq-Maghreb demographic differentials 
became clearly revealed by large fertility surveys in the late 1980s-early 1990s, the idea was 
advanced that “cultural models encountered through international migration to a certain 
extent reinforce the geography of demographic transition : the Maghreb, which has a foothold 
in Europe through its émigrés, has experienced a marked decline in its birth rate whereas the 
Egypt of the Infitâh, strengthening its Arab exchanges by a million and a half expatriates in 
the Gulf, saw it rise again temporarily from 1974 to 1985. […] Migration itself contributed to 
the renewed rise in the birth rate, because of the Egyptians’ contact with the large family 
standard common in the Gulf—footnote  : For the same reason, one could assume that 
migration to Europe has accelerated the decline of the birth rate in the Maghreb” (Fargues 
1993: 164). Later on, a comparison between Morocco and Egypt reiterated the hypothesis 
that emigration contributes to the diffusion in emigrants’ home countries of ideas and models  17
prevailing in their host countries, and emphasized that contrasted marriage patterns were key 
factors differentiating the level of fertility in the two countries (Courbage 1995).  
Subsequent studies of marriage in Egypt revealed that rising material expectations 
and increased consumerism among the youth had affected the cost and the timing of 
marriage, and they attributed this transformation to changes in aspirations—notably 
regarding the acquisition of consumer durables—repatriated in Egypt from Saudi Arabia and 
other Gulf countries by waves of men labor migrants, as well as to actual increases in income 
and standards of living generated by emigrant workers remittances. Singerman and Ibrahim 
(2003) found that, with a dramatic increase in the 1970s and the 1980s then stabilization in 
the 1990s, the cost of marriage in Egypt has been responding to the growing then stabilizing 
size of the Egyptian labor migration to the Gulf. Other scholars have interpreted decreasing 
rates of economic activity among woman at 20-24 years between 1988 (24%) and 1998 
(21%)—“contrary to the expectations for a period of structural adjustment”—as a sign that 
“modern marriage in Egypt may offer young girls something of greater value than the 
alternative of earning their own income through wage work” (Amin & Al-Bassusi  2003: 3). 
However strong they are, material motives are not the only force at play. Ideas also matter. In 
this respect, it is probable that social and cultural conservatism encountered in Saudi Arabia 
by Egyptian migrants and brought back home to a more open Egyptian society, are part of the 
explanation (Singerman & Ibrahim 2003).  
Why did Egyptians or Jordanians, but not Moroccans or Tunisians (or Turks, outside 
the Arab world) translate material aspirations raised by the contact with wealthier societies 
into conservative views and practices in family building related matters? What are the 
mechanisms determining women to gain access to the wealth in circulation, either through 
marriage and rising dowry (Egypt and Jordan), or rather through economic activity and paid 
labor (Tunisia and Morocco, or Turkey)? This paper’s contention is that international  18
migration has served as a vehicle to the patriarchal model where emigrants were bound for 
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, and to the individualistic one when they were destined to Europe. 
In other words, migration is hypothesized to have brought about normative changes, whether 
towards reinforced control of the family over its members or towards increased individual 
autonomy.  
 
5.  Upstream diffusion of demographic models by migrants 
What would have been the level of fertility had no international migration taken 
place? Comparisons over time and space offer an imperfect but workable method to answer 
the question.  
 
Let us compare firstly Morocco and Egypt over time. The last three decades have been a 
period of intense emigration for both countries. Annual flows of emigrants are not recorded, 
Figure 3 : Remittances and Birth Rates in Egypt
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but remittances are. Money transferred by emigrants is directly linked with increases in 
household income that are hypothesized to play on patterns and timing of family building. In 
addition, one can reasonably assume that their amount is a good proxy for the intensity of the 
overall relationship kept by emigrants with their home country, i.e. a remote proxy for ideas, 
values and models they convey to the community left behind. The contrast between Egypt 
(Figure 3) and Morocco (Figure 4) is striking. The time correlation between remittances and 
birth rates is as highly positive in the former (+0.623) as it is negative in the latter (-0.741).  
Standardized index defined as: [x – average(x)] / standard deviation (x) 
 
This paper does not develop the particular role that can be attributed to state policies 
in the discontinuous history of birth control and fertility decline in Egypt (Fargues 1997) but 
Figure 4  : Remittances and Birth Rates in Morocco
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contents itself with noting how perfectly any change in private money transfers made by 
emigrants translates with a time lag of around two to three years into a parallel change in 
birth rates: as if income provided by emigrants played a direct role on the cost of children 
(alleviated by additional resources from abroad) but not on the desired size of the family 
(unchanged). Morocco offers a pattern opposing to that of Egypt: not only remittances and 
birth rates vary in opposite directions, the first ascending and the second descending, but the 
irregularity of remittances contrasts with the perfect regularity of birth rates, as if remittances 
themselves had no direct impact on birth rates. It is rather the size of the Moroccan expatriate 
community and the intensity of non-material links its members develop with Morocco which 
matter here: the continuous circulation of ideas is not subjected to the same ups and downs as 
money transfers. To sum up, time series suggest that Egyptian migration to the Gulf did not 
bring home innovative attitudes regarding marriage and birth, but rather material resources—
in quantity varying with years—for the achievement of traditional family goals. On the 
contrary in Morocco, emigration to Europe has coincided with a fundamental change of 
attitudes, without variations in material resources drawn from emigration affecting the trend.  
Time correlation is not causation, however. For asserting that migration truly contributes to 
determining the pace and direction of changes in birth rates, rather than simply covariates 
with these changes – which would happen if migration on one side, and the decline of fertility 
on the other side, were two independent outcomes of a same third evolution, such as an 
increasing openness of societies to the outside world – one has to verify that changes in birth 
rates vary with the degree of exposure to migration, i.e. that regions from where intense 
emigration has departed display more dramatic demographic changes than those with little or 
no emigration: the closer the agents of diffusion, the stronger their impact. Space correlations 
are expected to corroborate time correlations.   21
In both countries, emigration and the pace of fertility transition are found to covariate 
in space.
21 In Egypt (Figure 5), the higher the rate of emigration the slower the process of 
fertility decline, a correlation which suggests that migration has curbed forces of change, 
possibly in relation with a stronger exposure to conservative ideas prevailing in countries of 
emigration, i.e. the Gulf and Saudi Arabia. The contrary holds for Morocco (Figure 6) where 
contact with European culture and way of life established through emigrants had accelerated 
demographic change.  
 
                                           
21 Note that space correlations are lower and in opposite directions than time correlations. 
 
Figure 5 : Emigration to the Gulf and the Transition of Fertility in Egypt at the time 
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A key intermediate variable between emigration and demographic change populations 
left behind seems to be education. On one side there is overwhelming evidence that education 
is the single most important determinant of the transition of fertility in developing countries 
(Cleland & Hobcraft 1985, Jejeebhoy 1995), and MENA individual countries are not 
exceptions to this worldwide rule, even though this is not a one-to-one relation. In Egypt as 
well as in Morocco, declines in fertility have been associated with rising education, in 
particular among women. 
On the other hand, MENA data support the hypothesis that migration has had an 
impact on the average education of non-migrant populations left behind, and that this impact 
varies according to the region which major streams of emigrants are destined to: emigration 
to the Gulf would have slowed down the progress of education in regions of origin, while 
emigration to the West would have sped it up.  
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Effectively, in Egypt emigration is negatively associated with the progress of 
education, while in Morocco a positive association is found (Table 3). Whether the 
antecedent is education or emigration––that is whether regional differences in education are a 
cause or a consequence of regional differences in emigration —cannot be established with 
data that were available for preparing this paper.
22 
Evidence from Turkey goes in the same direction (Figure 7). If one excludes the most 
developed provinces of the country—those where an early demographic transition was 
recorded in the wake of a modernization process which took place during the first half of the 
twentieth century, i.e. before emigration to the West started (Duben & Behar 1991)—one 
finds a negative correlation between cumulated emigration before 1990 (as reflected into the 
proportion of expatriates per 1,000 inhabitants in the 1990 population census) and the 
child/woman ratio in 2000 (reflecting fertility in the 1990s). As in Morocco, this negative 
association corresponds to the combination of a positive correlation between emigration and 
education (education index in 2000) and a negative correlation between education and 
fertility (Table 3). 
                                           
22 Emigration indexes used here are stocks, i.e. cumulated numbers of emigrants (return migrants in Egypt) at 
the time of the survey/census, which thus refer to migration movements that took place during the open period 
of time before the survey/census.  Education indexes are those provided by Human Development Reports and 
all refer to 2000.   24



































The important point is that emigration to the West could have fostered education in 
regions of origin of migrants, thus indirectly contributing to the demographic transition of 
non-migrant populations. Ideas and values would have impacted on a key structural 
determinant of fertility. The inducement effect of migration on the formation of human 
capital in migrants’ countries of origin does not refer to the “brain gain” hypothesis, 
according to which the success encountered abroad by highly skilled emigrants would 
encourage their non-migrant fellow citizens to invest in education, thus resulting in more 
human capital than if no brain drain had taken place (Stark, 2000). It rather emphasizes the 
impact of migration on the average level of mass education. Evidence accumulated in various 
contexts shows that remittances being channeled by families, they reach the very places from 
where migrants come and are used for basic needs including education and health care, i.e.  25
for human capital investment (Newland, Kathleen and Erin Patrick 2004). In addition to this 
general argument, we argue that, if emigrants are living abroad in a context where education 
is more widely spread than in the region where they come from, then they convey pro-
education values to their community of origin.  
 
Conclusion: the global demographic benefit of migration 
When people move from one country to another, they change their cultural, social and 
economic environment, as well as their individual position in the environment where they 
actually live. Such a change impacts on the way they behave, including in matters related 
with demographic reproduction. It can be a direct impact on marriage and fertility, or an 
indirect one, through education. Because migrants are conveyors of values and ideas to the 
world left behind, non-migrants in countries of origin can themselves react to changes 
induced by mobility. Beyond the space distribution of inhabitants on earth, international 
migration impacts on their reproduction. In which direction it alters demographic processes—
producing either more or less fertility—will depend on the social, economic and cultural 
context in which migration takes place. 
Populations of the Middle East and North Africa have known intense movements of 
international migration starting from the 1970s, i.e. during the critical decades of the 
demographic transition, at a time when fertility contrasts across the world were sharper than 
ever. Most emigrants from the Maghreb and Turkey headed to Europe, while most emigrants 
from the Mashreq took the way of the Arab Peninsula and the Gulf. The first encountered 
societies where small size families and individualistic values were predominant, while the 
second found societies with larger families than those left behind and deeper-rooted 
patriarchal values.   26
From where they now lived, be it Europe or Arabia and the Gulf, these emigrants of 
modern times could keep close and often daily ties with their home society. Through these 
ties, they could have an impact on the way marriage, family building and the education of 
children evolved in their country of origin. This paper has established that migration to 
Europe was in fact accompanied by an accelerated move towards low birth rates, while 
migration to the Gulf coincided with a slowed down pace of fertility transition. In other 
words, emigration may have indirectly altered the demographic reproduction and affected 
population numbers in the regions of origin, resulting in fewer inhabitants in the Maghreb  
and Turkey, but in larger numbers in the Mashreq.  
Two broader conclusions can be drawn. The first relates to global demography. In 
most of modern international migration, the host society has a lower level of fertility than the 
home society. From this point of view, migrants from Turkey and the Maghreb to Europe are 
the rule and those from the Mashreq to Arabia and the Gulf, the exception. The acceleration 
of demographic transition found in Turkey and the Maghreb to be correlated with migration 
to Europe suggests that, if a similar relation were to apply to any migration from high to low 
birth rates countries, then international migration would have produced a global demographic 
benefit, under the form of relaxed demographic pressures at the level of the world.  
The second conclusion relates to the circulation of ideas. If it turns out that emigrants 
are agents of the diffusion of new ideas in matters related with family building and education, 
then the same may apply to a wider range of civil behaviors. Because modern migrants keep 
strong links with their community of origin, they are susceptible to become key conveyors of 
ideational change among non-migrants in these communities.  27
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Table 1: Total fertility rates*
/ (children per woman) of foreign citizen women 
residing in France, compared with their country of origin and with French 
women, around 1980, 1990 and 2000 
 
Citizenship Residence  1980  1990
 2000 
Algerian France  4.22  3.22 
 3.19 
 Algeria  6.77  4.67
 2.97 
Moroccan    France   5.14  3.51 
 3.32 
 Morocco  5.65  4.03
 2.87 
Tunisian   France  5.21  3.93 
 3.29 
 Tunisia  5.30  3.62
 2.16 
Turkish   France  5.13  3.73 
 3.35 
 Turkey  4.40  3.40
 2.57 




/ the total fertility rate (TFR) is the final average number of children born per woman, 
obtained as the sum of age specific fertility rates from 15 to 49 years, during a given period 
of time. 
 
Sources: France (in 1982, 1990, 1999): Legros 2003 ; Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey: 
United Nations 2003. 
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Table 2: Total fertility rates in 1999 among foreign women residing in 
France, according to date of immigration 
 
Nationality \ Date of immigration  1980-89  1990-99 
Algerians     2.66  4.08 
Moroccans    2.91  4.31 
Tunisians    2.66  4.46 
Turks   2.46  3.99 
Source: Legros 2003  
 
 
Table 3. Correlation Coefficients between Emigration, Education and Fertility in Egypt, 
Morocco and Turkey 
 
Variables  Egypt   Morocco   Turkey(1)  
Emigration x Fertility   + 0.66  - 0.29  - 0.42 
Education x Fertility  - 0.85  - 0.45  - 0.84 
Emigration x Education  - 0.50  +0.26 (U) / + 0.40 (R)  + 0.32 
(1) Correlation computed on provinces with a HDI below 750     31
 
Table 4: Estimation of Net Migration using UN sources – Example of Morocco, 1950-2000 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Year t  Total  Birth  Death   Natural  Expected  Net 
 Population Rate Rate  Increase Population  Migration 
   [t,t+5] [t,t+5]  [t,t+5]    [t,t+5] 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
1950  8953 0,0504 0,0257  0,0247  8953  2 
1955  10132 0,0504 0,0227  0,0277  10130  -11 
1960  11626 0,0501 0,0196  0,0305  11637  -218 
1965  13323 0,0482 0,0174  0,0308  13541  -231 
1970  15310 0,0456 0,0157  0,0299  15541  -474 
1975  17305  0,0394 0,013 0,0264  17779  -365 
1980  19382 0,0371 0,0114  0,0257  19747  -45 
1985  21995 0,0323 0,0089  0,0234  22040  -161 
1990  24564 0,0267 0,0074  0,0193  24725  -214 
1995  26839 0,0244 0,0066  0,0178  27053  -229 
2000  29108  0,0232 0,006 0,0172  29337  -158 
2005  31564 - -  - 31722   
____________________________________________________________________ 
1950-2005          -2104 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Columns (1) to (3) United Nations 2003; Columns (4) to (6) computed by the author 
as: (4)=(2)-(3) ; (5)=(1)*Exp[(4)x*2.5] ; (6)=(1)-(5) 
 
N.B. Table 4 shows how migration flows can be estimated (very imperfectly) in the absence 
of any reliable source on migration, using the United Nations demographic database. 
Cumulated migration from 1950 to 1990 (amounting to -1,503 in the example of Morocco) 
divided by the total population in 1990 (24,654 million in Morocco) gives the rate of 
cumulated migration provided in Table 5 (Morocco: -6.1%).   32
Table 5: Migration and Fertility in Selected MENA Countries at the Time of Maximum 
Variation in Fertility 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Country  Cumulated  Total Fertility Rate 
   Migration 1950-90 / Population 1990  1985-90 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Western Migration System 
Morocco -6.1%  4.6 
Algeria -7.3%  4.8 
Tunisia -11.2%  3.9 
Lebanon -34.3%  3.4 
Turkey -2.3%  3.7 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Gulf Migration System 
Egypt -4.5%  5.4 
Palestine -60.0%  6.6 
Syria -3.1%  6.6 
Yemen -9.1%  7.6 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Source: Cumulated migration is computed by the author applying the 
method described in Table 3.  
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 Table 6: Remittances and births rates in Egypt 1970-2000 
 
Year  BR  Remittances M$  Year  BR  Remittances M$ 
 per  Current  1970    per  Current  1970 
  1000 prices prices    1000  prices prices 
1970  36.4 29 29  1986 37.6  2505  446 
1971  36.3 27 52  1987 35.4  3604  407 
1972 36.1  104  79  1988  33.2  3770  368 
1973  36.3 117 143  1989  30.8 3293 305 
1974  36.1 268 195  1990  28.8 3743 240 
1975  36.7 365 324  1991  27.6 2569 192 
1976  37.2 755 429  1992  26.9 3028 177 
1977  38.4 928 652  1993  27.4 3835 172 
1978 38.4 1773  824  1994  27.7  3232  168 
1979 38.2 2213 1041  1995  27.9  3279  144 
1980 36.9 2696  956  1996  27.8  2798  137 
1981 36.7 2181  869  1997  27.3  3256  137 
1982 37.2 2439  876  1998  27.3  3718  143 
1983 38.4 3666  907  1999  27.4  3772  143 
1984 39.0 3963  828  2000  27.4  3747  136 
1985 38.6 3212  570         
Sources: Birth rates: CAPMAS; remittances at current prices: Central Bank of Egypt; at 1970 
prices: computed by the author using indexes of prices provided by CAPMAS. 
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Table 7: Remittances and births rates in Morocco 1980-2000 
 
Year  BR  Remittances (MDir)  Year  BR  Remittances (MDir) 
 per  Current  1980    per  Current  1980 
  1000 prices prices    1000  prices prices 
1980 39.0 4211  4211  1991  28.1 18739 8681 
1981 38.1 5484  4556  1992  27.3 19796 8471 
1982 37.2 5697  4866  1993  26.6 19876 8116 
1983 36.1 6787  5034  1994  24.2 19261 7559 
1984 35.0 7990  5669  1995  23.9 18711 7293 
1985 33.8  10378  6552  1996  23.6 20622 7173 
1986 32.7  13548  7394  1997  23.2 20255 7406 
1987 31.6  14135  7361  1998  22.8 22025 7356 
1988 30.8  11683  6956  1999  22.4 21120 7851 
1989 29.9  12400  7264  2000  21.9 25784 8685 
1990 29.0  17688  8009 
 
Source: Annuaire statistique du Maroc, various years.          35
 
Table 8: Emigration to the Gulf and the Transition of Fertility in 
Egypt at the time of the Gulf War (1991), by Governorate 
_______________________________________________________ 
Governorate Returnees    Percentage of the 
  from Iraq & Kuwait  Fertility Transition 
  per 1,000 inhabitants  Completed in 1991 
_______________________________________________________ 
Port Sa‘îd  4.52  76.1% 
Cairo 5.26  74.1% 
Alexandria 4.02 65.1% 
Suez 3.91  60.1% 
Qalyûbiyya 2.66  59.3% 
Buhayra 6.18  58.8% 
Gharbiyya 11.61  58.7% 
Minûfiyya 6.70 56.4% 
Aswân 2.17  56.2% 
Dumyât 13.03  53.7% 
Daqahliyya 14.29  53.5% 
Isma‘îliyya 4.43  50.5% 
Sharqiyya 5.24  48.7% 
Gîza 3.67  48.3% 
Kafr al-Shaykh  9.04  46.1% 
Banî-Suwayf 10.32  40.1% 
Fayûm 6.88  37.9% 
Qîna 10.88  29.3% 
Asyût 13.90  25.9% 
Minyâ 9.45  25.2% 
Suhâg 23.48  15.5% 
_______________________________________________________ 
Source: Geographical distribution of returnees provided in Khûrî 
1991. Percentage of the fertility transition completed in 1991 
computed by the author as [45-CBR(1991)]/30 where Crude Birth 
Rates by Mohâfaza in 1991 are given by CAPMAS. 
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Table 9: Emigration and the Transition of Fertility by Province in Morocco 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Province (1)  (2)    Province  (1)  (2)
  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
   Oued Ed-Dahab    42%      Oujda-Angad   7,1  77% 
   Boujdour  5,4  29%      Taourirt  1,0  70% 
   Laâyoune  1,1  61%      Casablanca  9,6  95% 
   Es-Semara  7,3  39%      Mohammedia   11,1  81% 
   Guelmim  7,4  53%      Khémisset   3,4  64% 
   Tan-Tan    67%      Rabat   12,0  99% 
   Tata  3,1  39%      Salé-Al Jadida   3,1  65% 
  Agadir-Ida ou Tanane 13,4  76%      Skhirate-Témara   3,5  71% 
  Chtouka-Aït Baha   4,7  68%      El Jadida  2,6  62% 
  Inezgane-Aït Melloul   0,9        Safi  2,2  45% 
  Ouarzazate   15,4  44%      Azilal  0,8  43% 
  Taroudannt  4,2  63%      Béni Mellal  9,4  81% 
  Tiznit   12,3  68%      El Hajeb   6,8  63% 
  Zagora    35%      Errachidia   7,3  55% 
  Kénitra   5,6  65%      Ifrane   4,2  59% 
  Sidi Kacem   3,9  47%      Khénifra   3,4  69% 
  Ben Slimane   6,0  73%      Meknès-El Menzeh   19,6  90% 
  Khouribga   10,1  72%      Boulemane   2,3  52% 
  Settat   8,3  59%      Fès Jdid-Dar Dbibagh   11,4  69% 
  Al Haouz     26%      Sefrou   4,7  76% 
  Chichaoua     26%      Al Hoceïma   12,9  35% 
  El Kelaâ des Sraghna   5,1  66%      Taounate  3,3  39% 
  Essaouira     54%      Chefchaouen  0,8  19% 
  Marrakech-Médina   4,0  80%      Fahs-Bni Makada    40% 
  Berkane  0,7  70%      Larache  13,6  41% 
  Figuig   3,2  57%      Tanger-Assilah  19,4  68% 
  Jerada     45%      Tétouan  4,1  58% 
  Nador   6,1  67%      Total  6,7  57% 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(1) Emigrants, per 1,000 inhabitants 
(2) Percentage of the Fertility transition achieved between 1984 and 1992 
Source : Author’s calculation from Hamdouch 2000 (emigrants) and CERED, various dates 
(birth rates)   37
Table 10: Emigration, Fertility and Education by Province in Turkey   
    
Province  (1) (2) (3) (4)  Province  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Kocaeli  25 318 942 869  Trabzon 63  308 821 718 
Yalova   277 954 838  Afyon  41  381  82 715 
İstanbul  31 295 956 837  Niğde 19  403  832  712 
İzmir  18 254  94 829  Karaman  68  386 856 712 
Bursa  20 290 927 829  Sivas  58  393 809 707 
Muğla  10 280 928 823  Kırşehir 78  331 864 707 
Sakarya  36 322 918 817  Malatya 25  269 811 706 
Bolu  37 275 915 814  Kastamonu  16  288 816 704 
Tekirdağ 15 270 944 800  Bartin    285 851 702 
Balıkesir 17 274 896 792  Sinop  43  326 819 701 
Ankara  28 276 926 792  Osmaniye    397 853 699 
Bilecik  12 286  92 790  Elazığ 73  355  814  698 
Antalya  12 297 901 788  Giresun  45  332 786 688 
Eskişehir  19 256 942 787  Bayburt  94  444 692 686 
Denizli  34 314 882 784  Tunceli 101  287 855 685 
Çanakkale  9 236 914 782  Tokat  30  418 782 683 
Aydın  15 295 855 782  Çankırı 25 349  785  681 
Manisa  12 298  86 780  Ordu  36  387 772 677 
Zonguldak  34 263 893 773  K.maraş 59  474 806 674 
Kırklareli  18 244 945 773  Aksaray  113  403 818 670 
Edirne  15 234 911 769  Gümüşhane 73  394  765  669 
Artvin  24 303 894 759  Diyarbakır 13  610  682  668 
İçel    22 295 863 757  Yozgat  93  412 781 665 
Uşak  58 310 873 751  Erzurum 32  464 784 661 
Adana  27 368 884 751  Ardahan    416 852 655 
Samsun  38 347 868 747  Erzincan 50  367 793 653 
Hatay  91 409 861 747  Adıyaman 32  492  77  652 
Kayseri  52 370 895 746  Kars  37  501 809 644 
Burdur  24 293 887 746  Batman  16  716 707 644 
Karobük   278 893 744  Mardin  34  691 685 637 
Gaziantep  35 520 839 742  Siirt  9  816 693 636 
Kilis   464  81 739  Igdir    547 767 632 
Konya  40 404 836 738  Şanlıurfa 21  662  649  619 
Nevşehir 54 354 851 735  Van  11  761 671 616 
Düzce   313 888 735  Hakkari  9  810 703 611 
Kütahya 23 303 845 732  Bingöl  82  486 701 601 
Çorum  38 370 827 726  Bitlis  8  668 656 577 
Rize  36 304 871 725  Muş 33  651  643  574 
Isparta  26 348 844 724  Ağrı 24  706  642  572 
Amasya 25 322 872 721  Şırnak 17  950  651  560 
Kırıkkale  17 346 837 720           
 
(1) Emigrants per 1,000 inhabitants in 1990; (2) Child woman ratio, per 1,00 in 2000     
(3) Education index x 1000 in 2000; (4) Human development index x 1000 in 2000   
  